Social Warfare
“In war the chief incalculable is the human will.” – B. H. Liddell Hart
“Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.” – A. A. Vandegrift
Warfighting is a US Marine Corps treatise on their philosophy of war, and it’s good. In the book, they define war as “a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.” This touches on a theme that has being unraveled through the course of my reading and writing – an external concept of reality is uncertain and up to interpretation, and is dictated by those with social dominance, who set the standards for cultural capital; the only “true” reality is the social interaction between members of the human race. People with competing external concepts of reality, also known as the “frame”, will often resort to violence unless one frame can subsume another one – even in subtle ways. The notion of competing frames is the basis for all of social interaction and is what we enjoy in comedy in television or the theater. I wish to do more reading in this area, especially with regards to grooming and cooperation vs. threat displays, and I will soon be stocking up on books on primatology. Anyway — we go to war to impose our will, or frame, on another party. So it is not only nation states that go to war, but everyday humans in love, business & sport: it is with that lens that I read Warfighting.
Friction
Friction is “the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” Although external, environmental and enemy threats may cause friction, friction may also “be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, unclear or complicated plans, complex task organizations or command relationships, or complicated technologies.” Many of these are issues I’ve addressed previously on the blog. Lack of a clearly defined goal is an important factor in susceptibility to manipulation. Complicated plans showed be eschewed in favor of simple steps; the psychology of games is not too different from the psychology of real life (that post is an excellent reader for avoiding “complicated technologies”). It seems that the USMC has recognized the value of simplicity, because a major thesis of the book is that war is a fundamentally human process and therefore its processes should be built a framework of human nature. Keep it simple, make sure you have a mastery of the basics.
Reducing Internal Friction
And if a fair fight is the result of poor planning, then the first step we can take is by organizing ourselves – especially during peacetime; that way, when the shit hits the fan, we can be ready to roll. However, it is critically important that our peacetime initiatives simulate real-world conditions. The practice and buildup of skills is also known as procedural memory, but memory recall and skill performance is state-based: we recall skills that were built with similar enviornmental prompts. In my amateur view, this means environments that triggered similar neurochemical stimulus, since memory pathways are based on unique combinatorics of neurotransmitter pathing. If we learn important skills during simulated stressful situations, then we will be able to properly execute them in other stressful situations (triggering cortisol, GH and norepinephrine).
We must attempt to reduce our friction and “raise our enemy’s friction to a level that weakens his ability to fight”.
Uncertainty
The ambiguity and inherent uncertainty of war mandates us to take action based on incomplete information. Colin Powell espouses a philosophy of taking action when you have information that predicts a 40-70% likelihood of success. Of course, the authors of Warfighting are quick to point out that “it is precisely those actions that seem improbably that often have the greatest impact on the outcome of war”. Ahh… we have been revisited by our old friend The Black Swan.
Uncertainty and disorder go hand in hand; the USMC recommends we build a framework which we can use to navigate disorder, and also seek to generate disorder and use it as a weapon against our opponent.
Fear, The Mind Killer
“The greatest effect of fires is generally not the amount of physical destruction they cause, but the effect of that physical destruction on the enemy’s moral strength.” I’ve read a bunch of sports psychology books and they all say that given a basic baseline parity of skill, whoever wants to win more will win. I interpret this as having resoluteness of frame (mental strength, moral strength, our interpretation of reality; I get to mix moral strength with interpretation of reality because of the importance of values (and thus, morality) in determining reality and philosophy).
Science vs. Art
“Art includes the creative, situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and experience, and so the art of war subsume the science of war….the conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.” It is only by having a rigorous foundational training in the sciences that we can learn how to creatively apply them – but at the end of the day, if our will to win isn’t high enough, we lose. I plan on taking a 10-day meditation course in order to strengthen my mind, and I do feel like I lack certain sufficient training in the physical sciences (physics, chemistry). Any recommendations of good books there?
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“Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack. One defends when his strength is adequate; he attacks when it is abundant.” – Sun Tzu
I notice that I only win, win, win when I am on the attack – whether it be in sports (poker or basketball), getting something accomplished sociosexually, or business. For example, the recent awesome success of AwesomenessReminders has catapulted me into reactive territory, where I’m spending time dealing with the deluge of emails and interview requests rather than proactively accomplishing goals (the release of new, additional products; unleashing strategic ad campaigns; personal development via reading & articulating via the blog). But no more – today I set out a list of six goals to accomplish, and I will EMP the fuck out of whatever is in my way in order to get there.
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Pause for Reflection
What are some of sources of friction that have brought me down in the past?
- Hacker News – debatable, my participation in this community may prove to be a wise investment of time; HN is becoming an important relay outlet for valuable information on the internet. Unfortunately, it has also encouraged me to spend a shitload of time reading stuff that I can’t readily integrate – articles from successful entrepreneurs on arcane processes that aren’t germane to my present goals – though I may be benefitting from positive social influence/contagion from people more successful than me.
- Bad relationships (friends/enemies/girlfriends); inability to read body language and intent
- Obsession with self-image – this ties into #1 and in many ways #3,5,6,7
- Smoking
- Drinking
- Poor nutrition
- Misinformation
- Racketing (I’m taking Landmark Forum this weekend to help me deal with this)
- Narrative Construction (see #9, #4)
I dropped out of freshman physics so please bear with me on the science metaphors – it seems like each source of friction is also in some ways a two-sided lever, like a see-saw; each brings benefits but also detriments.
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War As An Act Of Policy
“War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of military force….the single most important thought to understand about [the USMC's] theory is that war must serve policy.” I interpret this as a dictate: The wars that you wage should serve your premeditated intentions.
Two Types, Two Ways
There are two ways to use military force to impose will on an enemy. One is through the elimination, permanent or temporary, of the enemy’s military power; this is known as the strategy of annihilation or, at least, incapacitation. This is power through dominance.
The second way is convincing the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to resist; also known as a “strategy of erosion”, this uses military force to erode the enemy leadership’s will. This involves using force to raise the cost of resistance higher than the enemy is willing to pay. This strategy is useful for “limited political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.” I see this one in youthful romantic relationships all the time; notable examples include a woman coming into a relationship with the purported intentions of casual sex. The male has the upper hand, because it is his frame, dominance and ego that is being served. Then, he becomes addicted to the sex, and his frame is subsumed by the woman’s: a relationship, or even worse, marriage, ensues. Drug dealers use a similar strategy; how many times have you been offered a “free sample”? Free samples appear in all shapes and forms.
It is my understanding that Islam, under the Caliphate, used strategy #2: everyone either dies or consents to Islamic conversion/rule (tax).
Attrition vs Maneuver
Warfare by attrition is straightforward: wear your enemy out and rack up the body counts. See an enemy concentration? Perfect, bomb it. Warfare by maneuver, on the other hand, revolves around incapacitating the enemy systematically. See an enemy concentration? Avoid it, it’s a strength. Instead, concentrate on attacking an enemy weakness and “eliminate a key element which incapacitates the enemy systematically.”
On the social battlefield, do you know the foundation for someone’s confidence? Is it an external achievement that can be mocked, spiraling them into a whirlwind of mental spinning, taking working memory resources offline, unable to support skill execution? Do they have faulty pillars of self-esteem? An entire book should be written: an inventory of relevant tactics.
“We should try to ‘get inside’ the enemy’s thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself so that we can set him up for defeat. It is essential that we understand the enemy on his own terms.”
“Similarly, we must try to see ourselves through our enemy’s eyes in order to identify our own vulnerabilities that he may attack and to anticipate what he will try to do so that we can counteract him.” My friend, who shall remain anonymous unless he decides to speak up in the comments, calls this “being bulletproof.”
“we can expect the enemy to disguise his dispositions in order to lure us against a surface [strength] that appears to be a gap [weakness].”
Speed, Focus, Surprise, Boldness
Social warfare could be distilled as a battle for the tempo. Other react when you proactively set the tempo. You can set the tempo through superior speed (forcing them always to play catch-up), surprise, focus, boldness, intelligent, ally support, resource domination. The tempo might well be renamed the “frame”. “Frequency” is a similar albeit somewhat different topic that I’m still unraveling.
“Speed is necessary in order to concentrate superior strength at the decisive time and place”; what matters is not absolute speed but relative speed. Superior speed forces reaction. This is huge!
Focus allows you to concentrate resources at critical points, economizing other positions and assuming increased risk.
Surprise, as I have written about before, stems from schema violation. The shock ensuing from surprise is a worthwhile boon, and maybe even the primary benefit of surprise: it induces panic and erodes the will. There USMC claims three ways to achieve surprise:
- Deception involves getting the enemy to plan for us to do something other than what we are really going to do. So we give the enemy a clear picture of the situation, but we give them the wrong picture
- Ambiguity requires us to act in an unpredictable way, forcing the enemy to plan for a plenitude of contingencies and therefore not properly for any one.
- Stealth is achieved when we deny the enemy any information of impending action.
Boldness is a strong outpouring of resources in the right time and the right place; the advantages of a surprise are exacerbated by proper boldness. Virgil said “Fortune favors the bold”, but boldness should be initiated based on strong situational awareness.
Critical Vulnerability and Center of Gravity
Find out which factors are critical to enemy: where are his strengths that, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our well? These are the suitably-named “centers of gravity”. A similar concept is that of critical vulnerability– “A vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist”. Looking for centers of gravity requires external focus on the enemy, rather than mechanical implementation of systematized procedures. Opportunities to exploit centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities must be seized and acted upon with boldness.
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I liked this quote: “Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in specific situations so much as it sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application. Therefore, while authoritative, doctrine is not prescriptive.”
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Leadership Gems
Leadership gems are something to be expected from a military book. Here are a few:
“Errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should deal with such errors leniently…Abolishing ‘zero defects’ means that we do not stifle boldness or initiative through the threat of punishment” They still, of course, advocate constructive criticism as part of the learning process.
“Until a commander has reached and stated a decision, subordinates should consider it their duty to provide honest, professional opinions even though these may be in disagreement with the senior’s opinions. However, once the decision has been reached, juniors then must support it as if it were their own.” Money.
“Because … no two situations … are the same, our critiques should focus not so much on the actions we took as on why we took those actions and why they brought the results they did.” Man, if there was ever a quote i needed to hear, this is it. Although it seems like common sense, it’s remarkable the frequency with which I beat myself up over errors – without pausing for the rough equivalent of a “5 Whys” analysis. I want to start doing this!
Mission tactics are the tactics of assigning a subordinate mission without specifying out it must be accomplished. This creates “freedom for initiative that permits the high tempo of operations that we desire….mission tactics requires subordinates to act with “topsight” — a grasp of how their actions fit into the larger situation…..we cannot allow decentralized initiative without some means of providing unity, or focus to the various efforts…>we seek unity not principally trough imposed control, but through harmonious initiative and lateral coordination within the context [ed: frame!] provided by guidance from above.”
“A subordinate commander who is not given a clear purpose for the assigned mission should ask for one….It is often possible to capture intent in a simple “…in order to …” phrase….statement of intent should be brief and compelling–the more concise, the better…Subordinates must have a clear understanding of what their commander expects. Further, they should understand the intent of the commander at least two levels up.”
“[Maneuver warfare] requires a certain independence of mind, a willingness to act with initiative and boldness, an exploitive mindset that takes full advantage of every opportunity, and the moral courage to accept responsibility for this type of behavior. It is important that this last set of traits be guided by self-discipline and loyalty to the objectives of seniors.”
Communication
Our philosophy of command must also exploit the human ability to communicate implicitly. We believe that implicit communication- to communicate through mutual understanding, using a minimum of key, well-understood phrases or even anticipating each other’s thoughts- is a faster, more effective way to communicate than through the use of detailed, explicit instructions.We develop this ability through familiarity and trust, which are based on a shared philosophy and shared experience. This concept has several practical implications…we should establish long-term working relationships to develop the necessary familiarity and trust….key people…should talk directly to one another when possible….we should communicate orally when possible, because we communicate also in…inflections and tone of voice….we should communicate in person when possible because we communicate also through our gestures and bearing.”
Specifically, on trust and “forward command”: “Only by their physical presence [on the frontlines]– by demonstrating the willingness to share danger and privation-can commanders fully gain the trust and confidence of subordinates.”
Combined Arms
“Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. we pose the enemy not just with a problem, but with a dilemma- a no-win situation.” It makes me think of a fork in chess. How can I create more of these opportunities in everyday life?
Decision Making
At the lower levels, “decision making may be an intuitive process based on experience”. At higher levels, “decisionmaking may be a more analytical process based on comparing several options. We should base our decision on awareness rather than on mechanical habit…act on a keen appreciation for the essential factors that make each situation unique instead of from conditioned response.”
Conclusion
Maneuver Warfare “is a statement of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulenrabilities, and by striking him in the way that will hurt him most….[it's] a philosophy for ‘fighting smart.’”
Warfighting is available on Amazon.com for only $7.99.
Recommended Reading: On War by Clausewitz, The Human Zoo by Desmond Morris, this presentation by Colin Powell
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